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On the Path From White to Schwinn
to Sylvania to. . .
John A. Maher, Jr.*
I. Introduction
Those who fear that indiscriminate institutional bias favoring frag-
mented competition in the theoretically unregulated sector of the Ameri-
can economy1 not only opposes the efficiency expected of free markets,
but is also insensitive to the challenges of a world economy, to the
detriment of the American consumer and society in general, welcomed
the Supreme Court's decision in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc. 2 The decision contains important lessons concerning design and
implementation of vertically-imposed restraints in the distribution chain.
* A.B. 1951, University of Notre Dame; LL.B. 1956, LL.M. (Trade Regulation)
1957, New York University; Professor, Dickinson School of Law.
1. "Throughout the history of [federal antitrust statutes] it has been constantly
assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve for its own sake and in
spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively
compete with each other." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429
(2d Cir. 1945) (emphasis added). The elevation of this assumption to an article of faith is
suggested by the following words of FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk: "This economic
size means economic and political power. I think that concentrating economic and political
power in an entity in our society is antithetical to the democratic tradition." FORBES, August
15, 1977, at 41. Chairman Pertschuk amplified these views in a speech entitled New
Directions for the FTC delivered in November 1977 before the 1 th New England Antitrust
Conference. He then observed that
antitrust cases have not focused with enough frequency or intensity on the most
important questions . . . . [T]o bring the structure and behavior of major indus-
tries and, indeed, of the economy itself more into line with the nation's democratic
political and social ideals . . . . [a]ntitrust has been preoccupied with, if not
entirely overtaken by, the narrow economic objective of allocative efficiency
. .. . When institutions get out of human scale, the result is alienation-and
alienation yields up increasing inefficiency as well as unhappiness. . . Competi-
tion policy cannot make every person a company president, but it can help assure
that there will be enough presidencies to aspire to so that the system will not be
stifled by a pervasive feeling that there is no room at the top. . . . Competition
policy must sometimes choose between greater efficiency, which may carry with it
the promise of lower prices, and other social objectives, such as the dispersal of
power, which may result in marginally higher prices. . . . We are. . . well along
the path to competition rulemaking.
840 ANiTrrtusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at 1-4, F (I 1/24/77) (emphasis added).
2. 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977). See also the summary order of remand to the Ninth Circuit
in McClatchy Newspapers v. Noble, 97 S. Ct. 2966 (1977).
A. The Schwinn Per Se Rule
Sylvania sounded the death-knell for the ill-conceived Schwinn3 per
se rule.' The Schwinn holding originated in litigation about a supplier's
resale restrictions on its wholesalers and authorized dealers .
Although vertically-imposed territorial restraints were not properly
before the Supreme Court in Schwinn, Justice Fortas summarized for the
majority that
[o]nce the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has
parted with dominion over the product, and his effort thereafter
to restrict territory or persons to whom the product may be
transferred-whether by explicit agreement or by silent combi-
nation or understanding with his vendee-is a per se violation
of §1 of the Sherman Act.
6
This language appeared only five years after Justice Douglas had written
for the majority in White Motor Co. v. United States7 that the Court
knew too little of either "the economic and business stuff out of which"
vertically-imposed'territorial and customer-selection restraints on resale
emerge or their "actual impact . . .on competition to decide whether
they . . . [warrant characterization' ] . . . as per se violations of the
Sherman Act. " 9
Apparently the Court believed it had acquired sufficient socio-
economic data by 1967 to announce a per se rule prohibiting territorial
and customer-selection restraints on resale even though the plaintiff did
not seek a judicial pronouncement of such draconian nature.10 Regret-
3. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
4. Id. at 378-79.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 382 (emphasis supplied). Restraints in the distribution chain ("vertical
restraints" or "vertically-imposed restraints") may be imposed by suppliers on their im-
mediate vendees and on those who procure from the supplier's direct customers, by
customers on suppliers, and by enterprises on their own conduct vis-a-vis actual or potential
reciprocals. The quoted language in Schwinn and comparable expressions in other decisions
have fostered the general use of "manufacturer" as a substitute for "supplier" in academic
and judicial formulations concerning vertical restraints. E.g., VerticalRestrictions Limiting
Intrabrand Competition, ABA ANTITRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH No. 2, 2 n.3, 3 (1977). The
author endeavors to limit use of the word "manufacturer" to those situations in which it is
literally correct. A given distribution chain susceptible to vertically-imposed restraints may
include "suppliers" engaged in extraction, intermediate processing, finishing, marketing,
transport, or other industries, and the restraints in question may originate at any one of
these industrial levels and operate on any of the other industries. Presumably, the Supreme
Court did not intend to limit the Schwinn per se rule to restraints imposed by "manufactur-
ers," as opposed to "suppliers," on their customers and subcustomers.
7. 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
8. This refers to the rationale for characterizing a restraint as offensive per se
enunciated in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
9. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). Interestingly, in his
dissent, Mr. Justice Clark predicted promulgation of such a per se rule within five years. Id.
at 283.
10. Brief for Appellant at 2, 23, 29, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365 (1967). The government half-heartedly sought enunciation of a doctrine of "presumptive
illegality" similar to that in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963);
Brief for Appellant at 41, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
tably, the Schwinn majority did not articulate which other practices
sufficiently threatened free market principles to warrant condemnation.
Vertically-imposed restraints on physical locations from which resales
could be made, at issue in the Sylvania decision," were not specifically
included in the practices condemned by Schwinn.12
The unexpected leap to a per se formulation gave rise to the anomaly
that while the per se rule applied to distributors' restrictions on territories
and customers, the same restrictions were remitted to the "rule of rea-
son" 13 when imposed on agents or consignees. 14 This distinction ignored
the realities that consignees may possess the same freedom of decision as
buyers-for-resale and also that the Sherman Act does not read on
contracts "for sale" as contrasted with contracts of agency or consign-
ment. 15 Further, although judicial characterization of a certain trade
restraint as offensive per se generally precludes argument about the
reasonability of later indulgences in such conduct,' 6 Schwinn apparently
adopted a qualified per se rule for vertically-imposed territorial or cus-
tomer-selection restrictions. In Schwinn Justice Fortas seemed to suggest
commercial contexts in which such constraints would not be exposed to
per se condemnation because of the nature of the perpetrator or the vigor
with which it sought to implement the restraint. 17
B. Per Se Rules In General
Potentially far more important than the undoing of the Schwinn
doctrine is a signal implicit in both the text and context of the majority
11. Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2552 (1977).
12. Brief for Appellant at 16 n.7, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365 (1967). The ultimate order in Schwinn made it quite clear that
nothing [would] prevent Schwinn from maintaining and creating or eliminating
areas or territories of prime responsibility for its distributors; from choosing and
selecting its distributors and retailers or designating geographic areas in which such
distributors shall respectively be primarily responsible for distributing. . . ; from
designating in its retailer franchise agreements the location of the place or places of
business for which the franchise is issued ....
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 291 F. Supp. 564, 565-66 (N.D. I11. 1968) (emphasis
added). A subsequent decree concluding a prosecution for horizontally-agreed territorial
allocation also respected legitimacy of location clauses. United States v. Topco Assoc.,
Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd, 414 U.S. 801 (1973). Legitimacy of such
clauses is not a new issue. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 139-40
(1966); Boro Hall Corp. v, General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 695 (1943).
13. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); United States
v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61,87 (1912); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,52
(1911).
14. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379-81 (1967).
15. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
16. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
17. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365,380-81 (1967). Applicabili-
ty of the tying per se rule is also subject to rebuttal. Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United States v. Jerrold
Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 560-61 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567
(1961).
opinion in Sylvania that the present Court is receptive to well-conceived
attacks on predicates for prior characterizations of commercial conduct as
offensive per se to section 1 of the Sherman Act. Concerning context,
note that reversal of Schwinn was not indispensable to the ultimate
disposition of Sylvania. Location constraints dealt with in Sylvania were
not explicitly proscribed by the Schwinn decision. Consequently, their
appraisal under the rule of reason was feasible.' 8 Concerning text, the
Sylvania opinion explicitly endorses the per se mechanism. Justice Pow-
ell, writing for the majority, invoked the classic Northern Pacific expli-
cation of the per se mechanism's role.
There are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeem-
ing virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. 9
This teaching is refined by Justice Powell's observation that "[pier se
rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is
manifestly anti-competive." 2 He stressed that litigatory efficiencies are
insufficient to justify creation of per se rules. 2' This contrasts notably
with Justice Marshall's apologia in United States v. Topco Associates,
Inc. 22
The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining dif-
ficult economic problems. Our inability to weigh, in any mean-
ingful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the
economy against promotion of competition in another sector is
one important reason we have formulated per se rules. 23
While there was truth in this confession, this rationale should never
justify characterizing a practice as antisocial on its face. Hopefully
Sylvania marks a retreat from the propensity to condemn that which is not
understood precisely because it is not understood.
While the demise of the unfortunate Schwinn per se rule indicates
this Court will not be blinded with stereotypes or beguiled by specters,
the majority opinion in Sylvania protests a bias in favor of per se
characterizations of trade restraints adopted on the horizontal level and
vertically-imposed resale price maintenance. 24 Superficially, the predi-
cates supporting condemnation of the latter are the same stuff out of
18. Sylvania ranks with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), as a
judicial exercise in stretching to make or unmake law when such an effort is unnecessary to
resolving the controversy between the immediate parties. Justice Powell wrote the majority
opinion in both decisions.




22. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
23. Id. at 609-10.
24. Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2558-59 n. 19, 2562 n.28
(1977).
which Schwinn was drawn, and one wonders about the manifest anticom-
petitiveness of resale price maintenance with particular emphasis on
suppliers' unilateral fixing of maximum resale prices. The unnecessary
stretching to undo Schwinn in combination with reorienting the per se
characterization to focus on the "manifestly anticompetitive" suggests
the Court is willing to review at least some established characterizations
of commercial conduct as offensive per se.
It will not be an easy path for those seeking review of any given per
se rule. Such persons, in devising a strategy, should draw a lesson from
the difficulties experienced by the Justice Department in the Huck case,
25
in which the government belatedly sought reversal of the General Elec-
tric doctrine2 6 that assessed price-fixing by licensors of patents under the
rule of reason. 27 Further, counsellors dealing with vertically-imposed
restraints, including those most directly affected by Sylvania, must re-
main wary of the FTC and its current authority to address activities that
may transgress the antitrust laws 28 or otherwise offend national policy as
perceived by the Commission. 29
This article will consider "nonprice vertical restrictions" 0 in light
of Sylvania and its implication for commercial relationships in the distri-
bution chain. Because counselling of commercial enterprises requires
consideration of devices beyond the vertically-imposed territorial re-
straints in Schwinn and Sylvania, this article will discuss a broad range of
restrictive techniques used by either suppliers or customers. A secondary
purpose, inescapable in light of Sylvania's re-examination of per se rules,
is the consideration of certain devices commonly thought to demand
treatment as offensive per se.
II. The Arena
A. Commerce
To say that commercial life is variegated is to indulge in simplica-
tion. The illusion can no longer be indulged that this nation or continent is
self-sustaining. If a lesson can be drawn from OPEC, 31 Soviet grain
25. United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 227 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Mich. 1964), aff'd by an
evenly divided Court, 382 U.S. 197 (1965).
26. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
27. At the trial level in Huck, the government did not seek to challenge the General
Electric rule, but urged on appeal that price-fixing within the patent licensing relationship be
characterized as violative per se of § I of the Sherman Act.
28. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). See note 101 and accompanying text
infra.
29. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). See note 58 and accom-
panying text infra.
30. Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2558-59 n.18 (1977).
31. Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a Vienna-based consor-
tium of nations whose purpose is setting price schedules for certain petroleum products
produced in and exported from their respective territories. While its ability to ignore the
relevance of demand to price has been largely successful in the short-term, its long-term
speculation, the coffee cartel and other manifestations of officially-sanc-
tioned and even government-led cartels, 32 it is that the American public is
now aware the nation is necessarily a participant in a multi-national
economy on a non-charitable basis. Popular acceptance of this fact has
been furthered by the very real and ominous international emergence of
anticompetitive forces comparable to those against which the Sherman
Act was deployed originally. While politicians can still attract public
attention with the specter of IBM, ITT, General Motors, or the integrated
oil companies imposing an economic lock on the nation, it is arguable
that the Sherman and Clayton Acts33 have not failed in their economic
purpose within the jurisdictional reach of the United States but that our
institutional preference for domestic fragmentation prejudices the United
States' competitive position in world markets.
Within the United States and other industrial nations, complex
procurement and distribution problems attend production and marketing
of goods and services. Integration within a commercial entity of several
steps in the chain running from capital investment and resource exploita-
tion through ultimate distribution is not uncommon. Such integration is
never total, although it is a conceivable objective. To the degree that
integration of functions is efficiently managed, it puts substantial pressure
on competitors who have not acted similarly.
Competition in distribution entails use of various techniques, which
are shaped by the nature of the product or service and the perceived field
of customers, to foster demand. Quality or its image is frequently im-
portant to decisions by the ultimate consumer, and a supplier's remote-
ness from the ultimate consumer affects its ability to control quality and
its image. Merchants who aspire to long-term success and who do not
anticipate expropriation normally seek to generate repeated sales to the
same customers or class of customers. If intervening levels of a distribu-
tion chain have the capacity to adversely affect quality or its image, a
prudent merchant will attempt to minimize such exposure by limiting that
capacity.
Excluding efforts to eliminate intermediaries by acquisition or other-
wise, several applied antitrust problems flow from a supplier's interest in
incentivizing others in the chain to move its goods or services without
impeachment of its image. These include margin-oriented techniques,
such as resale price maintenance and discrimination in price, and various
nonprice restraints in addition to those dealt with in Sylvania. Suppliers'
desire to maximize quality control (in the cause of promoting repeat sales,
success is dubious because of built-in debasement of importers' currency, differing political
aims among OPEC members, and the ability of major consumers to form a counterpart
organization.
32. See, e.g., European Common Market moves toward establishing a man-made fiber
cartel. FORBES, November 1, 1977, at 120; CHEMICAL WEEK, October 26, 1977, at 28.
33. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
minimizing products liability exposure, or satisfying regulatory require-
ments) at the level of the ultimate consumer by marketing through
similarly-committed distributors or retailers has become a prominent
predicate for various nonprice restraints. Such distributors or retailers
may merely resell their suppliers' goods as such or reprocess them before
sale. Suppliers, in the interest of encouraging resellers' investment orient-
ed to maintain a quality image, or actual quality through assured service,
and retarding price erosion, will consider definition of exclusive ter-
ritories, minimal storage facilities, adequate handling or rehandling
equipment and techniques, classes of sub-customers, complementary
products or services, and minimum employee capacity. To the degree
suppliers do so, they verge on various practices within the scope of
antitrust regulation. These include exclusive dealing34 and sales 35 ar-
rangements, requirements contracts,
36 tying, 37 territorial confinement,
38
customer selection standards,
39 and site location limitations.
4
While most of these restraints are typically considered to be
conceived and imposed by suppliers, they need not all be. A contractor,
wholesaler, or retailer may demand that its supplier refrain from either
selling to competitors of the customer or marketing in an agreed territory
or trade that will be exploited by such contractor, wholesaler, or retailer
as a condition to its using or featuring the supplier's line.
B. Vertically-Imposed Restraints
Some of these practices are regarded with more suspicion than
others. Thus, species of exclusive dealing, requirements contracts, and
tying are covered by section 3 of the Clayton Act, which focuses only on
restraints imposed by suppliers of commodities in context of probable
deleterious effects on competition. 4' The Supreme Court deems tying by
a supplier more heinous than exclusive dealing and requirements
34. Exclusive dealing comprises the commitment of a wholesaler, retailer, or commer-
cial consumer to its supplier to stock or use only the product or service line that is made
available by the supplier.
35. A supplier's commitment to a customer to supply a particular line to only that
customer in a given territory or for a given trade constitutes an exclusive sales arrangement.
The customer typically resells the goods with little reprocessing.
36. A commitment by a supplier or its customer to supply or take a substantial portion
of its output or needs to or from the reciprocal function.
37. A commitment by a seller to provide or by a buyer to take a product or service
from the other with the understanding that such a commitment is a prerequisite for access to
another (and presumably scarcer) product or service.
38. Typically an undertaking by a customer or subcustomer to confine its resale
activity to a defined territory.
39. Typically an undertaking by a customer or subcustomer to confine its resale
activity to an agreed class of prospects that may be identified by trade, distribution level, or
size. Conceivably, a comparable restraint could be imposed by a customer on a supplier.
40. An undertaking by a customer or subcustomer to confine its resale activity to an
agreed location in the sense of a store, without necessary restriction on the location or class
of its prospects for resale.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). Section 3 addresses the sale or lease of commodities only.
contracting, and thus, in certain circumstances,42 tying has been charac-
terized as offensive per sea3 to section 1 of the Sherman Act while the
latter have not." On the other hand, the Court has given FTC leave to
condemn practices that fall short of either exclusive dealing or tying, but
have the potential to mature into one of them. 45 Neither the Sherman Act
nor the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) is limited to commerce in
commodities or to restraints imposed by suppliers as opposed to cus-
tomers.
Exclusives exacted by customers of their suppliers are not addressed
by the Clayton Act and, thus, are assessed under the Sherman Act,'
although the ultimate effect of redundant exactions at the customer level
may be comparable to horizontally-arranged territorial allocations charac-
terized as offensive per se.47 Exclusive selling arrangements, unlike
classic territorial or customer allocation, do not necessarily preclude
sales within a region by nonsuppliers who possess the product or service.
Presumably, a consenting supplier has decided that its long-range inter-
ests are best served by limiting further exploitation of the trade or area.
The selection of other customers is, therefore, calculated to minimize
practicality of resale into the franchisee's territory without explicitly
committing such other customers against resale. There is no guaranty
against strong customers using this technique to control relatively weak
suppliers, and there is no current remedy for such domination except
through retrospective analyses appropriate to Sherman Act or FTC pro-
ceedings.
In contrast to "exclusive selling," "exclusive dealing" implies that
a reseller or commercial consumer avoids use of products or services that
compete with those bought from its supplier. Therefore, exclusive deal-
ing may contravene the Clayton Act4" or section 5 of FTCA 49 and is
certainly subject to rule of reason analysis under section I of the Sherman
Act. Exclusive selling and dealing are not contrary concepts and may be
complementary as a matter of negotiation.
42. See notes 70-74 and accompanying text infra.
43. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), 429 U.S. 610
(1977); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
44. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
45. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
46. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
47. United States v. Topco Assoc. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
48. Section 3 of the Clayton Act reads on exclusive dealing, requirements contracts,
or ties imposed by sellers or lessors of goods. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). Buyers or lessees of
goods, services, or realty are subject to regulation under the Sherman Act or section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), but their exclusion from Clayton Act coverage
evidences society's lesser concern with the activities of a buyer. This is also true of the
Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), much of which (including a prohibition
of buyer's knowing receipt of prohibited price discriminations) is embodied in § 2 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
While neither Schwinn nor Sylvania raised the issue of tying, it is
another species of vertically-imposed nonprice restraint. In essence, tying
is conditioning availability of a product or service upon the customer's
taking another presumably less desirable product or service. While suc-
cessful tying is clearly extortionate, exclusive dealing and total require-
ments contracting are not. Tying succeeds when the principal product or
service is vital to the buyer and difficult or impossible to procure from
another source. This is not necessarily true of exclusive dealing and total
requirements contracting, although- all can effect the same result of
foreclosing competition in a product or service. Perhaps because of the
"big business" image of defendants in the leading cases 50 and their
immunity from Clayton Act prohibition by reason of its focus on
commodities or perhaps because of its essentially coercive nature, tying
has been treated rigorously under section 1 of the Sherman Act. With
minor qualifications, 5 ' tying is offensive per se to the Sherman Act when
the perpetrator uses appreciable market power over the tying product or
service to foreclose a substantial volume of the market for the tied
product. 52 In practice, tying is not contrary to exclusive selling or deal-
ing, and the three could be encountered in any combination. Tying by a
buyer, whether through coercive reciprocity or sheer buying power over a
product or service for which supply exceeds demand, is quite conceivable
and would be subject to sanctions under section 1 of the Sherman Act.51
Conceivably, exclusive selling, exclusive dealing, or tying arrange-
ments could be accompanied by other restrictions on a party's conduct
and each restraint would be part of the total analysis. For example, if the
territory in an exclusive selling or dealing arrangement were loosely
defined or within a densely populated area, the supplier could insist on
limiting the site from which its exclusive seller operates or the buyer
could seek to limit locations of the supplier's other nearby customers.
Similarly, a franchisee might demand indemnity against infringement by
competing customers of the supplier as the price for cultivating the
50. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969);
United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1958).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545,560-61 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (pioneering companies). Dehydrating Process
Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 229 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961) (quality
control).
52. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
53. Insistence on barter in kind, particularly when currency is suspect, is not tan-
tamount to tying as prohibited by the Sherman Act. For an amazing suggestion that Justice
Department personalities may have felt to the contrary, see CHEMICAL WEEK, May 1, 1974,
at 11. Fortunately such suggestions are not always meaningful, particularly when a new
head of the Antitrust Division feels it may be necessary to force each producer to set prices
based on its own operating costs, which would mean that bigger, low-cost producers would
be forced to undersell less economic producers. CHEMICAL WEEK, September 28, 1977, at
56.
territory. Profit pass-over or pass-along arrangements are examples of
such indemnity.5 4
Vertically-imposed nonprice constraints thus fall into six categories:
restraints on the territory to which a supplier's marketing efforts can be
oriented; restraints on customers to which a supplier's efforts can be
oriented; restraints on resource selection; restraints on territorial or sub-
customer markets to which customers can orient themselves; restraints on
customers' methods of doing business (including site selection); and
theoretically non-restraining directory provisions such as designation of
geographical areas or customer classes of primary responsibility.
Many customer and supplier-imposed restraints, such as exclusive
selling, territorial or customer class confinement, limitations on the
physical base of customers' commercial activities, and assignments of
principal responsibility for discrete market sectors, ameliorate intrabrand
competition5 5 as an intended consequence of vigorously promoting inter-
brand competition at every level of a distribution chain. This is not true of
tying or exclusive dealing, which seek to minimize interbrand competi-
tion and, therefore, fall within section 3 of the Clayton Act. This presum-
ably indicates a greater continuing societal concern with artificial re-
straints on interbrand competition.
A significant purpose of the restraints on intrabrand competition is to
assure front-line merchants that they can concentrate on developing
demand for the product line without having to foster a market identity
separate from their supplier. A principal effect of Sylvania is to evoke
rational consideration under section 1 of the Sherman Act of practices that
are obviously oriented to promoting systematic interbrand competition. In
the absence of interbrand competition, such practices would be grist for
either section 5 of FTCA or the monopolization provision of section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 56 as served by Alcoa logic, 57 without need, in the case
of FTC, for the excesses implicit in S. & H.51 and Brown Shoe H.59
III. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
A. Rule of Reason
The Supreme Court provided an early guide for construing section 1.
In orienting inferior courts to the practices that prompted adoption of the
Act-power to fix prices, to limit production, and to effect a deterioration
54. Profit pass-over arrangements were permitted in the Schwinn and Topco decrees.
See note 12 supra.
55. Intrabrand competition between marketers of goods or services occurs when they
effect procurement for resale from a common supplier or operate under a common licensor,
as opposed to "interbrand competition" in marketing substitutable goods or services
originating from different resources.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
57. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
58. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1973).
59. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
in quality that is "the inevitable resultant of . . . monopolistic control
over . . . production and sale"'---the Court observed that "freedom of
the individual right to contract . . . was the essence of freedom from
undue restraint on the right to contract."61 From such language devel-
oped the central theme, known as the rule of reason, that the statutory
purpose was to "preserve from undue restraint the free action of competi-
tion . .. "62 and, ultimately, Brandeis' amplification that the
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps therejby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
. . . [Tihe court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint...;.. .nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, . . . reason for adopting the particu-
lar remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts.
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The word "ordinarily" relates to judicial development of per se rules that
are exceptional in nature and are oriented to particularized species of
commercial conduct.
B. Per Se Rules
In theory, when a practice is stigmatized as unreasonable per se by
the Court, defendants are precluded from arguing reasonability or incon-
sequence of the particular conduct. Ideally such characterizations come
about "only after [the courts have] considerable experience with [the]
business relationships" in question. 64 Schwinn, however, did not reflect
the ideal.
After Sylvania, per se rules condemn price-fixing or stabilization in
the horizontal or vertical array, horizontal territorial or customer alloca-
tions, horizontally-arranged production or marketing quotas, group boy-
cotts, and certain tying arrangements. While it has been argued that
pricing data exchanges between competitors are offensive per se by
reason of United States v. Container Corporation of America, the
concurring opinion disagreed with such characterization, 65 and the pre-
60. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911).
61. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
62. United States v. Union Pac. Ry., 226 U.S. 61, 87 (1912) (emphasis added).
63. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
64. United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972).
65. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 338-39 (1969). Mere
data exchange does not constitute a restraint, although it might provide a temptation or
facilitate tacit agreement. The Antitrust Division has, however, expressed concern over
public disclosure of price moves or their predicates. CHEMICAL WEEK, September 28, 1977,
at 5. Such concern is more alarming than the practice it addresses. Thus far there is no
commonly understood prohibition against voluntarily entertaining temptation, although tacit
agreement to stabilize prices may violate § I of the Sherman Act. Hopefully the Court will
resist inferring violation from parallelism or easy availability of data. Judge Weinstein in
United States v. Kliegman Bros., Inc., (No. 76-CR-650 E.D.N.Y. August 19, 1977), recently
reaffirmed that mere data exchanges followed by parallel conduct do not merit the per se
sent Court would be unlikely to include pricing data exchanges within the
per se list. The inclusion of tying is interesting in several respects.
Relegation of particular tying arrangements to the per se rule involves a
series of quality considerations 66 unnecessary to the other per se labels.
Furthermore, ties effected by pioneering companies and those seriously
concerned with quality control have been remitted to the rule of reason,
67
presumably along with those imposed by a "failing company" 68 and
companies suffering dramatic decline in their resource or market posi-
tions.
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Competitors' agreements to stabilize prices, divide territories, allo-
cate customers, adopt production or marketing quotas, or refuse to deal
with classes of or individual suppliers or customers offer clear analogies
to monopoly structure. The purpose is immunization from free market
forces. If participants in such agreements are an appreciable factor in the
market-place, they will achieve a measure of the desired immunization
and a reciprocal reduction of leverage otherwise available to those dealing
with the collective or one of its members. Although the forbidden fruits of
monopoly would not be fully achieved until competitors not involved in
the agreement were unable to handle the supply or demand against which
the agreement is arrayed, the collective possesses considerable potential
to disrupt ordinary market mechanisms.
This analogy to monopoly is not suited to tying and resale price
maintenance. The various species of conduct encompassed in "tying"
cannot operate successfully unless the perpetrator has sufficient economic
power to coerce others away from their normal pattern of reaching
buy/sell decisions. Thus, theoretically, the power to tie proceeds from
monopoly-like control over a vital good or service while horizontal
arrangements that are per se unlawful tend to establish monopoly power.
Tying endeavors should fail unless they proceed from real strength.
Absent such strength, an attempt at tying can not seriously distort the
market mechanism. The potential for broad-scale mischief in either tying
or attempts at horizontal market-rigging justifies per se characterizations,
although truly effective tying would seem to warrant prosecution under
section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Resale price maintenance raises different considerations. It does not
necessarily proceed from a monopoly-like position and does not tend
label. Perhaps a "mental state" test similar to that articulated in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfel-
der, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), should be a prerequisite to the conclusion that data exchanges and
parallel conduct are more indicative of collusive stabilization than vigorous competition.
66. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
67. Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (lst Cir), cet. denied,
368 U.S. 931 (1961).
68. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
69. In a related context, see dicta in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486, 503-04 (1974), about horizontal-level acquisition of a mineral company with
resources limited to existing commitments.
toward monopoly if effective competition exists at the resale level.
Indeed, in the Dr. Miles decision," the Supreme Court, although it
indulged in language suggestive of the Schwinn majority's fascination
with restraints on alienation, condemned maintenance of minimum resale
prices by analogizing to the market evils in horizontally-arranged price-
fixing:
[Dr. Miles] can fare no better with its plan. . . than could the
dealers themselves if they formed a combination and en-
deavored to establish the same restrictions, and to thus achieve
the same result, by agreement with each other. . . [C]ombi-
nations between dealers, having for their sole purpose the de-
struction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious
to the public interest and void.7
Clearly, such a horizontal arrangement would minimize or eliminate
leverage for those who are compelled to deal with combining merchants,
and such market-rigging is condemned regardless of whether it success-
fully produces the effect of monopoly. The most successful resale price
maintenance program will not, however, produce a monopoly effect as
long as the supplier has competitors. To this extent, vertically-imposed
resale price maintenance programs differ essentially from other species of
commercial conduct sharing the per se stigma.
Before the demise of the statutory exceptions for fair-trading72 it was
argued that licit minimum resale price maintenance had the effect of
maintaining higher prices to consumers even in the presence of competing
goods. 73 This assertion does not justify attributing a tendency toward
monopoly effect to minimum resale price maintenance and is an insuffi-
cient reason for stigmatizing maximum resale price maintenance, which
shares the per se characterization.74 In Albrecht v. Herald Co. ,7 Justice
White wrote for the majority that "schemes to fix maximum prices, ...
may severly intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete and survive [in
that the prices] may be . . . too low for the dealer to furnish services
essential" to its competitive struggle. 76 This possibility presupposes a
somewhat suicidal supplier and ignores the obvious purpose to protect the
broad image of the product or service from the dealer who is tempted to
extort high prices from his customers. Justice White also noted that pre-
set maxima "may channel distribution through a few large or specifically
70. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
71. Id. at 408.
72. The Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), and the McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 632
(1952), were repealed effective March 11, 1976. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
73. Hearings on S. 408 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 174 (1975).
74. Before the Supreme Court's reversal of Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968), the Eighth Circuit recognized social values in maintenance of maximum resale
prices. 367 F.2d 517, 522 (8th Cir. 1966).
75. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
76. Id. at 152-53 (emphasis supplied).
advantaged dealers . . . otherwise subject to significant nonprice
competition." 77 But this possibility is countered by the reality that small
dealers are often under price-cutting pressure from more advantaged
competitors. The probable nub of the holding was a fear that overt
maintenance of maxima may develop into a vehicle for covertly maintain-
ing minima.
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Arguments favoring rule of reason analysis of vertically-imposed
resale price maintenance are similar to those favoring such analysis of
vertical confinements on territories or customer classes. Some were
recognized in the Albrecht decision:
As a theoretical matter, it is not difficult to conceive of situa-
tions in which [suppliers] would rightly regard minimum resale
price maintenance to be in their interest. Maintaining [minima]
would benefit [suppliers] when the total demand for their prod-
uct would not be increased as much by the lower prices brought
about by dealer competition as by some other nonprice, de-
mand-creating activity.
79
It is evident that effective minimum resale price maintenance may restrict
the lower-margined reseller from passing the benefit of such efficiency to
its customers and prevents another reseller from deliberately labeling a
product as a loss-leader to attract traffic.' It does not, however, retard
nonprice competition of price-fixed products in terms of credit, delivery,
or subsequent service or price competition of other products. While it can
be argued that minimum resale price maintenance hinders ability to meet
a lower price on a competing brand, this is meaningful to the constrained
merchant only in the rare instance when he is unable to carry more than
one brand.
IV. White to Schwinn to Sylvania
A. Nonprice Restraints on Customers' Resale Activities
1. Motivations .- Suppliers frequently wish to retain some control
over nonprice aspects of redistribution of a product or service for reasons
both related and unrelated to the effect on price.
A satisfied consumer enhances the manufacturer's image and leads
to more sales. Consumer satisfaction may require a network of service
centers and maintenance of bulky inventories and a staff of trained
personnel, all of which demand investment by the supplier or some other
element in the market place. If the investment has a projected small
return, the supplier may be compelled to make the investment or procure
another to do so in support of the basic and, presumably, higher-margined
marketing effort.
77. Id. at 153.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 151 n.7 (emphasis added).
80. An unpressed merchant's intentional incurrence of losses on a given product or
service may be considered antisocial. See Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat.
1526, § 3 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1970)).
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Numerous conditions, including community image and state taxa-
tion, may motivate a supplier to find local merchants who will under-
take low mark-up servicing in return for the opportunity to market high
mark-up goods. The retailer, however, will not continue to provide
service if another dealer, who has avoided such investment, may routine-
ly dump the product in the service area. Thus, regardless of resale price
maintenance, remote suppliers in myriad situations wish to control vari-
ous features of intermediate distribution in their never-ending race for
consumer favor.
2. White Motor Co. v. United States.-Before Schwinn, the lead-
ing decision concerning vertically-imposed limitations on territories and
customer-selection was White Motor Co. v. United States. 81 In White a
minor participant in the automotive industry marketed its trucks and
replacement parts through wholesale distributors who sold to retailers and
consumers and also directly to selected retailers and substantial consum-
ers. The manufacturer limited resale to designated territories and custom-
ers and also implemented a resale price maintenance program.
82 Custom-
ers reserved to the manufacturer included federal and state governments
and "national" or "fleet" commercial users.83 The price maintenance
program was dual in nature: distirbutors were bound to offer the same
prices to their retailer customers that the manufacturer charged to its
direct-buying retailers; distributors and dealers were obligated to respect
discount schedules set by the manufacturer for parts sold to governmen-
tal, national, and fleet accounts. 
4
The manufacturer argued that the territorial confinements were es-
sential to its distribution chain in the contest against larger automotive
marketers and that customer selection constraints were imperative for
equal treatment of large customers whose patronage was indispensable to
the manufacturer. At the trial, the government was awarded summary
judgment on the price-fixing and confinement issues because both prac-
tices were offensive per se to section 1 of the Sherman Act.8 5 White
Motor appealed only from that part of the ruling prohibiting the limita-
tions on territory and customer-selection.8 6 By dropping wholesalers from
its distribution system, 87 the company implicitly admitted illegality of the
price-fixing.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, noted that White Motor
was the "first case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical arrange-
81. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
82. Id. at 255-57.
83. Id. at 257.
84. Id. at 260.
85. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
86. 372 U.S. at 256 n.2. Note the holding in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co., 321 U.S. 707, 720 (1944), that restrictions ancillary to price-fixing share its condemna-
tion when they are "an integral part of the whole distribution system." (emphasis added).
87. 80 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at I-A (1/22/63).
ment" to come before the Supreme Court88 and disclaimed competence,
because of the record, to decide whether the price-fixing tainted the other
restrictions. 89 The Court concluded it knew "too little of the actual
impact of both [the territorial constraint] and the one respecting customers
to reach a conclusion on the bare bones" of the record that they were
offensive to Sherman Act principles. 90 In contrast to horizontal arrange-
ments that are "naked restraints . . . with no purpose except stifling of
competition," 9 Justice Douglas observed that a vertical restraint
may or may not have that purpose or effect. We do not know
enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these
arrangements emerge to be certain. They may be too dangerous
to sanction or they may be allowable protections against ag-
gressive competitors or the only practicable means a small
company has for breaking into or staying in business [citations
omitted] and within the 'rule of reason.' We need to know more
• . . about the actual impact . . . on competition to decide
whether they . . . [citing Northern Pacific] . . . should be
classified as per se violations.'
Consequently, "a trial rather than the use of summary judgment [was]
necessary." 93 Significantly, the Court suggested consideration of the
standard used in testing acquisitions under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 94
The case was ultimately terminated by consent decree.
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Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in White Motor is noteworthy
for the observation that customer-selection restraints are "inherently the
more dangerous [than territorial limitations since cordoning off customers
serves] to suppress all competition between [supplier] and dis-
tributors, "9 but territorial constraints may "foster a vigorous inter-brand
competition which might otherwise be absent. "'  Why multi-level in-
trabrand competition is preferable to such competition at an intermediate
level was not explained. Justice Brennan indicated, however, that he
would look more favorably on territorial restraints imposed on unwilling
dealers by their suppliers' selfish interests. Evidence of such a condition
would be instrumental in rebutting a theory that the vertical form dis-
guised a horizontal agreement at the dealer level, but it would also
suggest power that is unavailable to the weak supplier.
It is also appropriate to note the FTC experience in Snap-On9 8 and
Sandura,99 which predate the judicial excess implicit in the S. & H.
88. 372 U.S. at 261 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 260.
90. Id. at 261.
91. Id. at 263.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 264.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
95. [1964] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 71,195 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
96. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 272 (1963).
97. Id. at 268.
98. Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
99. Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
decision. "° Although Snap-On and Sandura litigated the status under
FTCA of vertically-imposed nonprice restraints, the holdings are fairly
cited for the proposition that vertically-imposed territorial constraints
were not offensive per se to the Sherman Act. Other decisions suggest
that the sweep of FTC power is sufficiently broad that marketers should
continue to be very aware of it even when confident that Sherman and
Clayton Act standards are observed.' 0 '
In Snap-On, FTC ordered respondent to cease fixing the resale price
of its product, setting territorial limits within which its customers could
resell, excluding such customers from reselling to certain accounts, and
exacting noncompetition agreements effective after termination of the
supplier-dealer relationship. 1"2 The rationale for the Commission's action
was that the enumerated practices constituted a single system aimed at
preventing intrabrand competition.' 013 Snap-On was one of more than
eighty firms engaged in "bitter and bloody" competition. 104 While its
dealers were precluded from soliciting buyers outside their territories,
there were no restrictions within the territory.105 The Seventh Circuit
recognized that promotion of interbrand competition was vital, stating
that
manufacturers should be encouraged by the workings of the
antitrust laws to meet and promote competition of their prod-
ucts with those of competing brands, rather than . . . ham-
pered by those laws in the 'orderly marketing of [their] prod-
ucts.,106
In Sandura, the Sixth Circuit dealt with a small floor-covering
manufacturer who possessed 4.8% of a market in which the three lead
manufacturers controlled about eighty percent of industry assets and
dominated the market-place. "I0 While respondent in the underlying FTC
proceeding was not a "failing company," it had been exposed to the
threat of bankruptcy because of product failure. "'s To retain distributors it
granted exclusive territories to dealers who would provide regional ware-
100. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
101. FTC "does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice
against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of
equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed
in the spirit of the antitrust laws." Id. at 244. The Court did not define "public values"
except by dicta addressing whether a practice
without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public
policy as. . . established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in
other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some. . established concept of
unfairness; . . . whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous ....
Id. at 244-45 n.5.
102. Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825, 827 n.2 (7th Cir. 1963).
103. Id. at 830.
104. Id. at 833.
105. Id. at 832.
106. id. at 833.
107. Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 852 (6th Cir. 1964).
108. Id. at 856.
housing, maintain inventory, and advertise. Dealers testified that they
would not have taken Sandura on without the exclusivity.I°9 The Sixth
Circuit held that the territorial exclusivity increased "interbrand competi-
tion without . . . detriment to intrabrand competition,"110 after having
found that both implementation and continuation of the system was
justified by competition at Sandura's level, that no practical but less
restrictive alternatives"' were available, and that elimination of in-
trabrand competition was justified- by the interbrand effort, although
arguably "significant product differentiation" would increase the impor-
tance of intrabrand competition." 2
Although not intended as an exclusive benchmark, the Sixth Cir-
cuit's reasoning would be pertinent to a "rule of reason" inquiry. The
government's failure to seek overturn of either Snap-On or Sandura gave
tacit testimony to an official and informed conclusion that vertically-
imposed nonprice restraints can be tested under the rule of reason without
violence to societal norms and objectives."t 3 Schwinn emerged from the
trial court1 14 as Sandura was being decided.
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3. The Schwinn Case.-Schwinn, characterized by the trial court
as "a pygmy, compared to its giant bicycle competitors, Sears. . . and
Montgomery Ward,"" 6 was charged with franchising a limited number
of retailers who were obligated to procure the product from wholesalers
authorized for their respective areas by Schwinn; observe retail prices
fixed by Schwinn; refrain from reselling Schwinn products to
nonauthorized retailers; and refrain from marketing Schwinn products at
locations where they were not franchised. 117 The government also alleged
that Schwinn conspired with wholesale distributors to allocate exclusive
territories among such distributors; confined such distributors to the
territories assigned; confined their sale of Schwinn products to only
franchised dealers; and conspired with such distributors to boycott unau-
thorized accounts or those that failed to respect Schwinn's retail price
maintenance. 118 Schwinn franchisees were free, however, to carry other
brands of bikes and parts.
119
109. Id.
110. Id. at 858.
111. Possible alternatives would have included "primary-area-of-responsibility"
arrangements that rely on a dealer's obligation to exert best efforts in its territory to
preclude its invasion of another.
112. Id. at 857.
113. Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 823, 845-51 (1965).
114. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. 11. 1965).
115. The Sixth Circuit's decision in Sandura is dated December 30, 1964. The district
court's opinion in Schwinn is dated January 25, 1965).
116. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 334 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
117. Id. at 325.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 335.
The district court found that defendant had not engaged in price-
fixing, held that agreements between Schwinn and wholesalers and retail-
ers to restrict sales to allocated territories were offensive per se, and, in
effect, sanctioned Schwinn's other constraints on distribution that were
not the result of horizontal agreements on either the distributor or retailer
level. 120
The rule of reason, characterized as "the rule of common law that
generally what one may do himself he may likewise do by or through an
agent, ' 121 insulated transactions in which Schwinn distributors enjoyed
agent or consignee status, the confinement of distributors' resales to
franchised dealers, and the restriction against resales to nonfranchisees or
from unauthorized locations. 122 The court was satisfied that adequate
localized service and repair facilities were "an absolute essential for any
bicycle manufacturing company." 123 The court also affirmed that dis-
tributor-level territorial constraints would have been permissible had
Schwinn not slipped into a pattern of participating with distributors in the
definition of territories. 124
The government appealed from the district court's decision.
Schwinn did not. The government contended that the ultimate decree
should prohibit Schwinn from imposing territorial and customer-selection
constraints on all distributors including those who were supposedly its
agents or consignees and that Schwinn's prohibitions against sale to
nonfranchised dealers unreasonably restrained trade. 25 The Justice De-
partment did not request that the customer-selection limitations be charac-
terized as offensive per se 126 and made no great issue of the retailer-
location limitation. 127 On the contrary, it argued for "a standard of
presumptive illegality" that would have imposed on the defendant the
burden of establishing a procompetitive justification for nonprice
120. Id. at 342-43.
121. Id. at 334.
122. Id. at 334-35.
123. Id. at 338.
124. Id. at 342.
125. Brief for Appellant at 2, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967).
126. Id. at 22. During oral argument counsel for the government, in response to a
specific question from the bench, denied an ambition to achieve a per se rule, 35 U.S.L.W.
3373 (1967). Because White Motor had recently rejected per se characterization of a
supplier's restraint on its customers' territorial operation and customer selection, even
though they coexisted with illegal resale price maintenance, the government would have been
hesitant to seek a per se characterization for essentially the same non-price restriction in the
absence of price-fixing. For a different viewpoint, see remarks of the Hon. Donald H.
Turner, then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, in a panel
discussion captioned Orderly Marketing, Franchising and Trademark Licensing: Have They
Been Rented by Schwinn and Sealy?, 1968 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Antitrust Law Symposium,
30-31 (CCH 1968).
127. Brief for Appellant at 25, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967).
constraints on distributors' and retailers' marketing methods. 12' The
government also argued that the record established lack of justification to
avoid the possibility of a new trial. 1
29
The majority opinion was remarkable in many respects. 130 Relying
on the "ancient rule against restraints on alienation," 3' Justice Fortas
announced that a supplier's post-sale effort "to restrict territory or per-
sons to whom the product may be transferred . is a per se violation
.... ,"32 Since the status of territorial constraints on resales was not
before the Court, this allusion to territorial confinement was dictum. 133
He incorrectly credited the trial court with holding that "where a manu-
facturer sells products . . . subject to territorial restrictions upon resale,
a per se violation . . . results"1 34 when the decision below had actually
applied the per se rule to the product of horizontal combination. 135 The
Court exceeded the requested relief by characterizing certain vertically-
imposed nonprice restraints on resale as unlawful per se and condemning
territorial confinements on resale that were not before it and that, in the
estimation of Justice Brennan (concurring in White Motor), were less
fearful than customer-selection restraints. 136
The opinion was not totally in the government's favor because the
Court remitted comparable constraints on consignees to rule of reason
analysis. This was consistent with the Court's improbable concern for
common-law rules' 37 or, as described by the Justice Department, no-
tions 13' disfavoring restraints on alienation. The Schwinn decision also
acknowledged defendant's argument that a disciplined distribution sys-
tem was necessary to meet powerful competition at the manufacturing
and retail levels. 139 This aspect acquires added significance after Syl-
vania. The most remarkable result of Schwinn was the Court's simul-
128. Id. at 41. At an FBA-BNA briefing conference in November 1977, E. Perry
Johnson, FTC Bureau of Competition Assistant Director for Regional Operations, is said to
have suggested the promulgation of a Trade Regulation Rule addressing vertically-imposed
nonprice restraints that would use the presumptive illegality device. 838 ATrITRUST &
TRADE REG. REp. I-A (BNA).
129. Id.
130. See notes 10-17 and accompanying text supra.
131. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967). The Govern-
ment's brief made passing references to the "policy of the common law against a seller's
imposing a restraint on alienation by the purchaser" and such "notions of policy deeply
rooted in the common law." Brief for Appellant at 26-27, 39, United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Note that, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911), the Court also advanced such a theory, although the holding
seemed motivated by a speculative analogy to horizontally-arranged price-fixing. Id. at 407-
08.
132. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967).
133. United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 617 (1972).
134. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967).
135. 237 F. Supp. at 342.
136. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 272 (1963).
137. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 378 (1967).
138. Brief for Appellant at 26, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967).
139. 388 U.S. at 376, 380.
taneous creation of a per se rule and the qualification that its application
was contingent on a "conclusion" that defendant-supplier had been
"firm and resolute" in enforcing territorial or customer-selection
constraints on resale.1 40 The "firm and resolute" language was lifted
from a district court finding benign to defendant. 4 ' Justice Fortas'
citation of White Motor as authority for rule of reason analysis for
newcomers to an industry and failing companies may have been intended
as a further qualification." 2 Within the context of the opinion, the
language about "firm and resolute" enforcement, newcomers, and near-
failures came before announcement of the Schwinn per se rule and may
have been intended as a general background to the decision. Later cases,
however, used such passages as justification for avoiding the per se rule
when the defendant was not a newcomer, nor in dire straits, nor less than
"firm and resolute" in enforcing vertically-imposed restraints.
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Before commenting on such decisions, it is appropriate to note the
ultimate orders in Schwinn and in a subsequent case involving horizontal-
ly-arranged territorial allocations. In Schwinn, the district court or-
dered' 44 co-defendants, the bicycle manufacturer and an association of its
distributors, to refrain from limiting "the freedom of any distributor or
retailer of Schwinn products as to where and to whom it may resell such
products . . . . " The court, however, indicated that the manufacturer
could licitly create or maintain "territories of prime responsibility for
. . .distributors" or designate "in its retailer franchise agreements the
location of the . . . places of business for which the franchise is issued
.. ..,," In the later Topco' 46 case, the Supreme Court condemned
horizontal territorial allocation among retailers who were related vertical-
ly to a common supplier and trademark licensor as unlawful per se.
Thereafter, the order fashioned by the district court permitted creation of
areas of prime responsibility, designation of a site at which the trademark
in question could be used, and profit pass-overs as the price of invading
another's area.147 This order was more significant than that in Schwinn
because it was attacked unsuccessfully by the government.14s
4. Post Schwinn.-In the wake of the Schwinn decision, the Third
Circuit devised a fascinating means to avoid the newly-minted per se
characterization in Tripoli Co. v. Wella. 149 Defendant Wella contended
140. Id. at 372.
141. 237 F. Supp. at 342.
142. 388 U.S. at 374.
143. See notes 149-62 and accompanying text infra.
144. The order was vacated and the underlying action dismissed on December 14, 1977.
845 ANITRUSr & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 28 A.
145. 291 F. Supp. at 565-66 (emphasis added).
146. United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
147. [1973-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,391, as modified at 74,485 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
148. 414 U.S. 801 (1973).
149. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970).
that physical danger to the uninitiated justified limitation of distributors'
resales of its cosmetic lines to beauticians and barbers. Despite a long
relationship, Wella terminated Tripoli's distributorship when it dis-
covered the latter's sales to the public. Tripoli sued, and the trial court's
grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment implied a rejection of
a per se characterization of the constraints on Tripoli's resales.150
On appeal, the Third Circuit noted that "not all restraints in...
distribution fall into the per se category"' 5 ' and that restraints by "which
a manufacturer may exercise responsibility to the consumer,"' 5 2 must be
tested by a "standard of reasonableness." 153 In Schwinn Justice Fortas
had used a simple phrase in one of his formulations: "it is unreasonable
without more for a manufacturer to . . . restrict and confine areas or
persons with whom an article may be traded."1 Although use of
"without more" seemingly meant that per se characterization was appro-
priate without need to adduce more evidence of antisocial purpose or
effect, the Third Circuit applied a different construction with the pro-
nouncement that "there is more [in Wella] and the restraints are of a
different order" 15 5 from those in Schwinn. Given the dangers to an
uninitiated user and use of warning labels on Wella products, the Third
Circuit concluded that Wella had a "lawful main purpose, to which the
restriction on resale of potentially dangerous products is reasonably
ancillary. " 156
In retrospect, Wella can be viewed as a reaction to the unreasoning
sweep of Schwinn. A suggestion that the antitrust division shared the
Wella court's reaction is apparent in a 1969 consent decree that excepted
cases in which unrestricted resale would endanger "health or safety" of
animals or plants 157 from a general ban on customer selection constraints.
An unlikely court indicated another means to avoid Schwinn. 58
Carter-Wallace sued the government for alleged infringement of a drug
patent, and, by way of affirmative defense, the government charged
Carter-Wallace with patent misuse because of resale restrictions imposed
on two of its customers. The two customers bought the drug for use
limited to producing other materials at a price lower than that charged to
customers who were not restricted in use. 159 The court of claims cited
Wella for the proposition that Schwinn "did not automatically outlaw
150. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 286 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
151. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 936 (3d Cir. 1970).
152. Id. at 936 n.3.
153. Id. at 936.
154. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967).
155. Tripoli Co. V. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 936 (3d Cir. 1970).
156. Id. at 938.
157. United States v. Farbenfabriken Bayer A.G. and Chemagro Corp., [1969] TRADE
CAS. (CCH) 72,918 (D.D.C. 1969).
158. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
159. Id. at 1378.
any and all post-sale restrictions. ' ' 16 Because the two customers who
enjoyed the favorable price could elude any restraint on subsequent use of
the product by paying a not unreasonably higher price for it and such a
situation was not within the Schwinn scenario, the court thought it
entirely appropriate to subject the constraint to rule of reason analysis. 
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Another way of living with Schwinn was to require proof of "firm
and resolute" enforcement 162 of vertically-imposed restraints. Thus, the
apparent point in narrowly construing the application of the Schwinn per
se rule was to support those who would limit its scope to actual restraints.
While product safety, quality control, and failure to enforce punc-
tured the applicability of the Schwinn rule, the decision itself left various
practices open to rule of reason analysis. Justice Fortas had avoided
discussion of the propriety of territorial restrictions imposed on sales by
patent licensees. 163 This was construed as a signal authorizing continued
rule of reason analysis for territorial restraints explicit in not only pat-
ent,' 64 but also trademark 65 and tradename' 66 licensing.
In contrast to the reticence about restraints upon patent licensees, the
Schwinn court sanctioned definition of exclusive sales territories uncon-
taminated by restraints on franchisees' resales.167 Thereafter, lower
courts sustained vertically-imposed definition of areas of dealers' primary
responsibility for exploitation,' 68 obligations to pass along profit attribut-
able to invasion of another's territory, 169 and limitation to specific loca-
160. Id. at 1380.
161. Id. at 1381.
162. Reed Bros. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1055 (1976); Redd v. Shell Oil, 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912
(1976); Good Inv. Promotion, Inc. v. Corning Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891, 893 (6th Cir.
1974); Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 938 (1968); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 375 F. Supp. 610,
625-26 (E.D. Pa. 1974); In Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir.
1975), the circuit court rejected a quality-control justification for restraints because they
were ancillary to an illegal resale price-fixing scheme and remanded the case for the further
presentation of evidence to support the allegations involving section I of the Sherman Act.
506 F.2d 934 (1975).
163. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 n.6 (1967). This does
not suggest that licensors can constrain sales throughout the distribution chain; a constraint
can be imposed only on the licensee's sale. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873).
164. See, e.g., Dunlap Co. v: Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974).
165. Tomac, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 418 F. Supp. 359 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
166. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, Inc. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co., Inc., 542 F.2d
1053 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2973 (1977).
167. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967).
168. Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Kaiser v. General Motors Corp., 396 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa.
1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976).
169. Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assoc., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. II1. 1972).
Although the ultimate order in United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972),
permitted profit pass-overs, it is difficult to imagine a more effective restraint on resale and
intrabrand competition. If a dealer's profit from a sale in another's territory is extracted, the
remitting dealer becomes, in effect, the agent of the payee, since any sales in the payee's
territory are for its benefit and not the literal reseller's. In terms of excluding consumers
tions. 170 The last was grist for the Sylvania mill.
5. Sylvania .- Although location restrictions had been part of the
Schwinn pattern, 171 they were permitted by the ultimate order. 172 In
1974, however, a panel of the Ninth Circuit held that restricting the
location from which resale activities could be undertaken was unlawful
per se under the Schwinn formulae. 173 Although the decision was revers-
ed on rehearing, 174 the majority opinion placed a gloss on Schwinn by
commenting that the Schwinn rule should not be applied "too literally,
without sufficient reference to the textual context . . . or the facts from
which Schwinn arose.' "175 The essence of Schwinn related to preclusion
of resales rather than to the mechanics of fostering resales.
In Continental T. V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,176 a manufacturer
of television receiving sets, Sylvania, implemented a new marketing
strategy to improve its national market share. In three years it successful-
ly increased its share from less than two percent to approximately five
percent. The strategy included discontinuing wholesalers and reducing
the gross number of retailer relationships in favor of dealing directly with
retailers who were recruited for their competence and aggressiveness.
Retailers were committed to sell Sylvania sets only from approved loca-
tions. Sylvania, however, neither gave nor exacted exclusives from
retailers and it retained the right to add retailers in any area. 177
Dissatisfied with its 2.5% share of the area market in San Francisco,
Sylvania added another dealer at a location about a mile from Continen-
tal, an existing dealer. When Continental's protest over this added in-
trabrand competition failed, it cancelled a large order for Sylvania sets.
Continental, which had been refused status as a Sylvania retailer in
Sacremento, where the manufacturer already enjoyed a fifteen percent
market share, advised that it was moving an inventory of Sylvania sets to
a new Sacremento location and relations disintegrated rapidly. Sylvania
cut Continental's credit line by eighty-five percent; Continental withheld
payments due Sylvania's factor; Sylvania terminated Continental; the
from the supposed benefits of intrabrand competition, is this not equivalent to confining
resellers to defined territories? One district court has suggested that an overly generous
calculation of "profit" to be passed along would convert the entire arrangement into a
prohibited territorial restraint. Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assoc., Inc., 353 F. Supp.
1143, 1150-51 (N.D. I1. 1972). In effect, substantial profit pass-alongs are an indirect route
to achieve the same result as vertically-imposed territorial constraints.
170. Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975); Sheldon
Pontiac v. Pontiac Motor Div., 418 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1976); Kaiser v. General Motors
Corp., 396 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
171. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 10, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967).
172. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 291 F. Supp. 564, 565-66 (N.D. I11. 1968).
173. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental TV, Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 982 n. 1(9th Cir. 1976).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 989.
176. 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
177. Id. at 2552.
factor sued on the receivables; and Continental cross-claimed, alleging a
location constraint violative of the Sherman Act that was also part of a
price-fixing scheme. 1
78
At trial, the court refused to instruct the jury on the application of the
rule of reason to location restrictions. Rather, it charged that if the jury
found an agreement between Sylvania and a dealer under which the
manufacturer "exercised dominion or control over the products sold to
the dealer, after having parted with title and risk to the products, [they]
must find any effort thereafter to restrict outlets or store locations from
which . . . dealers resold . . . [to be violative] . . . regardless of the
reasonableness of the location restrictions." 179 Although the price-fixing
and other counts were rejected, this instruction led to a finding against
Sylvania on the location constraints.
80
Justice Powell, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court,
commented that the Court had never "given plenary consideration to
. . . the proper antitrust analysis of location restrictions. '- 181 While he
noted circuit court decisions favoring such restrictions, 8 2 he ignored the
Court's refusal to review the Topco order 83 and proceeded to discuss
Schwinn. Focusing on Justice Fortas' direction that the Schwinn decree
should enjoin understandings limiting "the retailer's freedom as to where
and to whom it will resell,""' Justice Powell concluded, "In intent and
competitive impact, the retail customer restriction in Schwinn is indistin-
guishable from the location restriction in [Sylvania]."
85
Unfortunately there is no clear index of how the present Court
deduced that the "intent and competitive impact" of restrictions on the
location where remarketing is based so change the essential nature of the
restraint that it can be equated with those limiting to whom sales can be
made. "Without more," mere site restrictions and literal preclusion from
customer groups cannot be equated unless one presupposes that the site-
restricted merchant is also foreclosed from media access, other tech-
niques for procuring orders from remote parts, and delivery systems. This
is particularly true in metropolitan settings where the undifferentiated
mass of potential customers can be attracted by numerous competitors
using available media, stressing accessibility, availability of parking
facilities, or easy credit arrangements. Justice Powell noted that Schwinn
had involved location constraints, but the point of his reference is unclear
since the transition to equating Sylvania's location restraints with the
178. Id. at 2553 n.9.
179. Id. at 2553.
180. Id. at 2553 n.9.
181. Id. at 2554 n.l (emphasis added).
182. Id.
183. On the meaningfulness of certiorari denials, see Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174
(1947).
184. Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2555, (1977).
185. Id. at 2556.
customer-selection restraints condemned in Schwinn is made via
Schwinn's analysis of prohibitions against supplying "nonfranchised
retailers. " 186
While the Sylvania opinion attempts to illuminate the equation by
observing that "[i]n both cases the restrictions limited the freedom of the
retailer to dispose of the purchased products as he desired" 1 87 and that it
is irrelevant to antitrust analysis that the focus of one "was addressed to
territory and the other to customers," 18 8 this merely juxtaposes a truism
with a mischaracterization of Sylvania's limitation. Sylvania's dealers
were certainly limited in location of their base, but this limitation did not
preclude sales into any territory they could exploit from the approved
base. This is very different from prohibiting Continental's sales to cus-
tomers located outside of San Francisco. Justice Powell, in a later part of
the Sylvania opinion,8 9 recognized that constraints imposed by location
restrictions are "practical" in nature, but this underscores rather than
relieves concern over the equation of restraint mechanisms condemned by
Schwinn with those at issue in Sylvania by reference to "intent" and
"impact. "1
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Having discovered equivalency of location and customer-selection
constraints, the Court then considered the propriety of Schwinn. Justice
Powell properly commented on Schwinn's failure to refer to Northern
Pacific's description of practices meriting the per se stigma' 9' and then
proceeded to an excellent review of socio-economic questions implicit in
vertically-imposed restraints, various views proposed about them, and the
internal illogic of the Schwinn opinion. 192 Indeed, assuming the validity
of the explicit predicate for reexamining Schwinn, his commentary is
marred only by employing the absence of legislative history to prove a
point inductively, a technique glaringly prominent in the majority opinion
of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,93 which he also authored. Fortunately,
in Sylvania the absence of legislative history is assigned a minor role in
dicta. 194
Ultimately, the opinion recognized that reduction of intrabrand




189. Id. at 2560.
190. Id. at 2556.
191. Id. at 2558.
192. Id. at 2561-62.
193. 425 U.S. 185, 196 nn. 14, 15.
194. For example, repeal of the McGuire and Miller-Tydings Acts is cited in a footnote
as evidence of congressional approval of "per se analysis of vertical price restrictions" as
contrasted with the lack of "similar expression of congressional intent ... for nonprice
restrictions." Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2459, 2558-59 n.18
(1977). That nonprice vertical restraints have never been the beneficiaries of anything
comparable to the qualified blessing afforded resale price maintenance by the late McGuire
and Miller-Tydings Acts should be obvious.
"certain efficiencies" concomitant with promoting interbrand competi-
tion.1 95 Consequently, Justice Powell announced reversion to the "stan-
dard articulated in Northern Pac. R. Co. and reiterated in White
Motor." 196 This standard demands inquiry into the reason for and impact
of vertically-imposed nonprice restraints to determine whether they are
pernicious in effect or without redeeming virtue. 197 The Court warned
against "the possibility that particular applications of vertical restrictions
might justify per se prohibition under [Northern Pacific]." ' 198 It did
recognize, however, that per se analysis would be justified only upon
proof of "demonstrable economic effect rather than-as in Schwinn-
formalistic line-drawing. 199 The line-drawing referred to is the Sch winn
majority's distinction between restraints on resellers and those on consig-
nees rooted in its curious respect for policy against suspension of aliena-
tion.
B. Where Does the Path Lead After Sylvania?
Had he also considered the rationale of Dr. Miles,' it would seem
unlikely--despite the reference to repeal of the resale price maintenance
enabling acts-that Justice Powell would have simultaneously indulged
dicta sanctioning the per se characterization of resale price maintenance
and attacked not only "formalistic line-drawing" but also the very line
common to Schwinn and Dr. Miles ,201 unless he wished to invite attack
on per se treatment of resale price maintenance. Aged, although question-
able, doctrines are generally more insulated by stare decisis than are
recent pronouncements. 2°1 Although the unexplained leaps in Schwinn
fairly demanded curative action, one hopes that Sylvania's single, but
vital, unexplained leap does not similarly expose it to reversal by a future
reconstituted Court. Assuming Sylvania will not be overturned or limited
in the near future, it affords important lessons for marketing men and
intermediate participants in the distribution chain.
Yet, there are pitfalls. For example, the Tenth Circuit withheld
disposition of Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc. 20 3 pending
195. Id. at 2560.




200. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
201. Id. at 407-08.
202. Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 n.30 (1977).
Ignoring stare decisis was made easier by the recency of the Schwinn decision and by the
subsequent debate concerning its wisdom and application. Lurking in the background were
the mathematically significant dissent of Chief Justice Burger in Topco who contended that
Schwinn was actually a rule of reason decision rather than a per se characterization for the
ages, United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596,617-18 (1972), and, more significant
philosophically, Justice Douglas' tendency to confine Schwinn to the facts of the bicycle
industry. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 155 (1967) (concurring opinion).
203. 561 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1977).
the Sylvania decision. 204 As noted in the Coors decision, the Tenth
Circuit had been a proponent of reconsidering the Schwinn rule and
sought "greater flexibility." 20 5 That position had resulted from a Coors'
encounter with FTC. 2°
Coors, a nationally famous brewer, marketed beer that, because of
its short shelf life, must be refrigerated from plant to consumer and that is
produced only at a plant in Colorado. To protect product integrity and its
reputation as a brewer, Coors markets only in areas accessible from its
plant and restricts sales to those who observe product handling directions
that effectively prevent knowing shipment out of the broad marketing
territory. The litigation began when Coors sued to restrain A & S from
buying beer from retailers in Colorado and transporting it out of state in
contravention of licensing statutes. A & S counterclaimed, alleging a
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act because of the territorially-
oriented resale confinements. Coors' complaint was ultimately dismissed
and the confinement issues were tried to a jury, which found for Coors.
Both sides appealed.'
In response to the A & S contention that the trial court's failure to
instruct the jury that Coors' efforts at "firm and resolute enforcement" of
constraints on resale constituted a per se violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 208 the Tenth Circuit held that Sylvania "disposes of this
issue adversely to A & S "29 since restraints on dealers are to be tested by
the rule of reason "if [their] positions and functions are indistinguishable
from those of an agent or salesman of the [supplier]. "....210 It must be
assumed that the limitation implicit in use of "if" in this formulation was
unconcious. The holding would otherwise require survival of the
Schwinn per se rule when a relationship not comparable to agency or
master-servant is proved. It is obvious that the major nonprice restrictions
addressed in White Motor and Schwinn, although they can be used to
create a vertically-integrated marketing team of otherwise independent
merchants to promote interbrand competition, have other uses with poten-
tial social value. A supplier's attempts to reduce exposure to products
liability or collisions with FDA provide easy examples. Location restric-
tions can promote the preservation of a licit security interest in goods as
well as interbrand competition. If the opinion of the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit were to be read literally, Justice Powell's clear consign-
ment of the Schwinn per se rule to history would be frustrated. Those
who favor a doctrine of "presumptive illegality" and would argue that
204. Id. at 809.
205. Id.
206. Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 1974).
207. Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807,809 (10th Cir. 1977).
208. Id. at 810, 812.
209. Id. at 812.
210. Id. at 813 (emphasis added).
the Tenth Circuit said exactly what it meant, must remember that
Schwinn rejected "presumptive illegality.' '2
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1. Suppliers' Interests .- Among Adam Smith's observations on
the operation of a free-market economy was the thought that the interest
of the provider ought to be attended only so far as necessary to promoting
that of the consumer. 212 Smith recognized that merchants' main purpose
was to serve themselves. His theory orients unregulated markets to the
welfare of consumers rather than merchants regardless of whether such
merchants are ultimate resources or intermediate participants in the distri-
bution chain leading to consumers. Therefore, if interbrand competition
is deemed valuable to consumers' immediate and long-range interests,
consumer interests in su'ch competition must be preferred over the inter-
ests of intermediate merchants who consider themselves either served or
prejudiced by limited restraints on intrabrand competition. Implicit in this
assumption is that restraints on intermediate merchants impact on society
only when they are imposed by de facto monopolists or act to deny
interbrand competition.
The increasing complexity of manufacturing and distribution pro-
cesses prohibits consumer examination of ingredients and necessitates
considerable reliance on supplier prudence. Failures in producer self-
discipline that damage consumers have long been a predicate for govern-
ment intervention. In stable societies, such interventions have not, how-
ever, hampered the selfish interest of suppliers who pursue a reputation
for giving a fair measure,2 13 albeit for nonaltruistic purposes. As distribu-
tion chains become more complex, the nonmonopolistic suppliers' same
selfish interest in consumer satisfaction should not be hindered merely
because they are not in privity with the consumers who are the be-
neficiaries of such selfishness.
Sylvania suggests that supplier-imposed restraints on resale should
be tolerated as long as such selfish exercises occur in context of effective
interbrand competition, do not deny the consumer choice implicit in such
competition, and do not entail undue restraint on intermediate merchants'
ability to pursue other commercial objectives. Sylvania recognizes that
differing perceptions of efficiency obtainable through diverse modes of
interbrand competition dictate that activity be continued on both inte-
211. See note 128 supra; Brief for Appellant at 38, 41, United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Very recently, while reversing a pre-Sylvania judg-
ment for plaintiff, the Seventh Circuit invited plaintiff to prove that territorial constraints on
a liquor distributor "justify per se prohibition based on demonstrable economic effect."
General Bey. Sales Co. - Oshkosh v. East-Side Winery, 396 F.Supp. 590 (E.D. Wis. 1975),
rev'd, 848 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 1-4, F (Jan. 26, 1978) (5th Cir. Jan. 9,
1978).
212. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TioNs, book I, ch. XI, at 358-59 (Pelican Reprint 1976).
213. In the realm of food standards, the interests of marginal suppliers may be served
in the name of consumer protection, for example, by mandatory standards of identity.
grated and nonintegrated bases subject to diverse and often parochial
influences such as taste, relative capitalization of competitors on all
levels, or a sense of personal identification achievable with a local
merchant. To the degree this is true, competition between literally inte-
grated distribution systems and those more loosely arranged should be
expected and encouraged. One form of encouragement is to permit
independent suppliers and intermediate merchants to combine specialized
competencies to divert market share from integrated competitors. The
liberality displayed in Sylvania would not seem to extend to agreements
designed to make semipermanent captives of resellers or suppliers.
2. Supplier's Conduct.-The rule of reason has historically ad-
dressed those restraints that are "unreasonable or undue." Brandeis'
guide merits restatement:
[W]hether the restraint . . . merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition . . . the court must ordi-
narily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after . . . ; the
nature of the restraint, and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the
reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help . . . to
interpret facts and to predict consequences.
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Both the rule and Brandeis' articulation were addressed to horizontal
arrangements that present the most obvious threat to free markets. They
are no less relevant to vertical relationships. His teaching is relevant to
strategy as well as substance. Those who contemplate trade restraints
perceived to be benign in purpose and effect should document the predi-
cates for that belief and projected effects.
Prior to Sylvania, there was no comparable guidance for gauging
vertically-imposed restraints. White Motor taught more by what it did not
say than by what it said. Justice Powell, however, was not content with
remitting us to Brandeis' words, Northern Pacific, and White Motor.
Instead he posited that "[m]arketing efficiency is not the only legitimate
reason for a manufacturer's desire to exert control over the manner in
which his products are sold and serviced" as our society concentrates on
product safety and quality. 215 White Motors' references to newcomers
and systemic interbrand competition are rephrased and fleshed-out by a
214. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (emphasis
added). In connection with the rule of reason, a Georgia district court drew an interesting
distinction between hardship on a retailer who had been compelled to remain open on a
twenty-four hour basis and anticompetitive conduct. Gordon v. Crown Central Petroleum
Corp., 423 F.Supp. 58 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 564 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1977).
215. Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 n.23 (1977)
(emphasis added).
series of examples 216 indicating that, although Justice Powell would find
procompetitive merit in agreements easing intrabrand competition,217 he
would not do so at the expense of intermediate merchants' ability to
refuse collaboration in the collective interbrand effort. He also resurrect-
ed the argument that permitting vertically-imposed restraints would bene-
fit small businessmen who otherwise fall victim to their suppliers' need to
integrate in response to integrated competition.218 This argument accords
with the need recognized in Robinson-Patman jurisprudence to permit a
supplier to grant a discriminatory price break that enables its customer to
meet competition from their common integrated competition.
219
While the central lesson of Sylvania is that vertical restraints clearly
oriented to furthering interbrand competition or consumer satisfaction
will survive muster, counsellors should pay careful heed to the nature of
the restraint in several senses. Does it go beyond that needed for the
assigned competitive or consumer-welfare objective? How vigorously
does a supplier suggest resale pricing? Are territorial or customer-selec-
tion constraints linked to exclusive dealing for such great periods of time
or in such finite territories as to make the constrained merchant a virtual
captive? Are ancillary features of the relationship (e.g., book-keeping,
insurance, attendance to suppliers' affairs, notice periods appropriate to
cancellation, minimum stocking) so demanding that they preempt inter-
mediate merchants' expansion into or with other lines whether they be
similar, complementary, or diverse?
While, assuming the absence of tying or resale price-fixing, the life
of a supplier who deems other vertically-imposed restraints conducive to
its competitive struggle has been somewhat simplified, its counsellors
should reconsider Brown Shoe if,2 2 particularly in light of the later S. &
H. decision, 221 and advise against assembly of such a package of re-
straints and dependency-inducing benefits from which FTC could discern
a pattern of preempting distribution channels.
222
216. Id. at 2560 n.22.
217. Id. at 2560-61.
218. Id. at 2562 n.27.
219. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 512 n.7 (1963).
220. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
221. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1972).
222. The decree entered against Schwinn has been vacated. Note 144 supra. Subse-
quently, the Schwinn Bicycle Company terminated dealer franchises as of March 31, 1978
and invited applications for renewal. Interestingly, the form of application provides not only
for an estimate of the percentage of sales to be represented by Schwinn and "Schwinn
approved" bicycles, but also identification of other brands to be carried. It also contains a
representation of understanding that Schwinn does not require exclusive dealing. A pro-
posed form of agreement includes Schwinn's offer of "a market with an established
potential and a limited number of Authorized. . .Dealers"; a dealer's undertakings to keep
"a neat and orderly retail store in a location approved by Schwinn" and to recommend
"purchase of Schwinn products"; and a mutual covenant disclaiming either an agency
relationship or appointment of the dealer as a wholesaler except for authorizing resale "to
other Authorized Schwinn dealers." Although the impact on dealers' perceptions is un-
known, the location and recommendation obligations do not appear limiting on dealers'
conduct. See Renewal Applicaton and Authorized Dealer Agreement (on file in the Dickin-
son Law Review office).

